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of insecure attachment styles, according 
to Ein-Dor et al., is that across evolution-
ary time, the costs of insecure attachment 
styles to individuals were exceeded by ben-
efits at the group-level. These group-level 
benefits are considered a driving selective 
force, not accidental byproducts of strate-
gies that are individually advantageous – 
hence the paradox. The central idea is that 
  insecure attachment styles are suboptimal 
to the individual, yet prevalent: this “evo-
lutionary paradox” is resolved by positing 
group-level benefits. On this view, inse-
curely attached individuals are evolution-
ary altruists: they incur a fitness cost to 
enhance the fitness of other individuals 
in the group.
Here, I first question the existence of the 
“attachment paradox” and then the solu-
tion  proposed  by  Ein-Dor  et  al.  (2010). 
For  attachment  research  to  benefit  from 
evolutionary biology, it is important that 
ideas about evolutionary processes, as well 
as assumptions about our human evolu-
tionary history, are correct and, whenever 
possible, complete. Thus, an integration of 
evolutionary  and  developmental  science 
requires,  in  addition  to  empirical  stud-
ies, conceptual analyses and discussion of 
key premises.
The hypothesis of Ein-Dor et al. (2010) 
assumes  that  insecure  attachment  styles 
are  maladaptive  to  the  individual:  how-
ever, the authors do not provide sources 
to support this claim. To my knowledge, the 
fitness effects of attachment strategies have 
never been measured in humans. It would 
be most informative if studies compared 
the number of viable offspring (or a dif-
ferent proxy for fitness) of individuals with 
insecure versus other attachment styles, in 
conditions in which insecure attachment 
styles tend to develop. Ideally, such stud-
ies would be conducted cross-culturally, 
in order to ensure results generalize across 
socio-ecological  conditions,  or  to  docu-
ment and understand variation (Henrich 
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In  a  recent  article  in  Perspectives  on 
Psychological Science, Ein-Dor et al. (2010) 
propose  that  insecure  attachment  styles 
harm the biological fitness of individuals, yet 
may have been favored by natural selection 
because they provide benefits for the group. 
This novel hypothesis proclaims that groups 
containing a mixture of secure and insecure 
attachment styles deal more effectively with 
hazards, such as venomous snakes or fires, 
because  of  earlier  detection  and  escape. 
While I support adaptationist approaches 
to  development,  including  attachment,  I 
have concerns about this specific proposal. 
In particular, I question: (1) that insecure 
attachment styles are detrimental to indi-
vidual fitness, (2) that insecure attachment 
styles  are  well-designed  for  dealing  with 
danger at the group-level, (3) the under-
lying assumption that human attachment 
styles evolved in social groups comprised 
mostly  of  genetic  relatives,  (4)  whether 
the  empirical  evidence,  provided  by  the 
authors, can arbitrate between hypotheses 
postulating benefits to individuals versus 
benefits to groups.
Ein-Dor et al. (2010) set out to explain an 
“evolutionary paradox”: insecure attach-
ment styles appear harmful to individual 
fitness, yet they are prevalent in human 
societies. Studies show that 33–50% of all 
humans may be insecurely attached (i.e., 
anxious, avoidant), across age groups, with 
higher percentages occurring in popula-
tions living in conditions of poverty and 
instability  (Cassidy  and  Shaver,  1999, 
2008; Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007). The 
solution to the “paradoxical” persistence 
et al., 2010). However, at present, the fitness 
costs and benefits of different attachment 
styles are unknown. Therefore, “the attach-
ment paradox” itself is a hypothesis, not a 
fact requiring explanation. Moreover, some 
theories suggest that insecure attachment 
styles can be advantageous to individuals, 
given  particular  conditions  (e.g.,  Belsky 
et al., 1991; Chisholm, 1996; Nettle, 2006; 
Del Giudice, 2009; Del Giudice and Belsky, 
2010). Insecure attachment styles may be 
adaptive, for instance, if one grows up in 
a  world  where  people  generally  provide 
little support (Belsky et al., 1991; Belsky 
et al., 2010).  Ein-Dor et al. (2010) view 
their proposal as complementary to this 
perspective.  However,  the  existing  work 
assumes  insecure  attachment  styles  are 
advantageous  to  individuals,  while  Ein-
Dor et al. (2010) depart from the exact 
opposite assumption – the “evolutionary 
paradox”  –  making  integration  difficult. 
Still, I will argue that even if we grant that 
insecure attachment styles may harm indi-
vidual fitness, explaining their evolution in 
terms of adaptive, group-level benefits, has 
several problems.
In biology, adaptations are identified 
when a trait accommodates a presumed 
function “with sufficient precision, econ-
omy, [and] efficiency” (Williams, 1966, p. 
10). The proposal of Ein-Dor et al. (2010), 
in my view, does not meet these crite-
ria. Ein-Dor et al. argue that two major 
insecure  attachment  styles  –  avoidant 
and anxious – evolved for their group-
level benefits: “The avoidant pattern may 
be  associated  with  quick,  independent 
responses to threat, which may at times 
increase  the  survival  chances  of  group 
members by solving the survival problem 
or demonstrating ways to escape it. The 
anxious pattern may be associated with 
sensitivity and quick detection of dangers 
and threats, which alert other group mem-
bers to danger and the need for protection 
or escape” (p. 129). Both these functions Frankenhuis  Evolution of insecure attachment styles
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groups, composed exclusively of insecurely 
attached individuals. Is it not the case that 
a larger number of vigilant eyes is better in 
dangerous situations?
In  sum,  while  I  support  adaptation-
ist approaches to development, including 
attachment, I believe there are significant 
problems with the hypothesis advanced by 
Ein-Dor et al. (2010): that insecure attach-
ment styles may be group-selected adap-
tations  for  dealing  with  danger.  Despite 
these  doubts,  I  value  the  novelty  of  the 
hypothesis, and I look forward to future 
theoretical analyses and empirical tests of 
the current ideas.
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of  the  costs  and  benefits  of  altruistic 
strategies in various group compositions 
(including the ratio of relatives to non-
relatives, and their degrees of relatedness). 
Biologists have made progress exploring 
the conditions favoring the evolution of 
altruism (e.g., Nowak, 2006): yet, much 
work remains to be done, especially in the 
domain of large-scale cooperation. It is a 
merit of Ein-Dor et al. (2010) to invite 
more discussion about human ancestral 
social  organizations.  A  better  under-
standing of these contexts may provide 
insights  into  the  evolved  structure  of 
developmental  mechanisms,  including 
their dynamic expression across the full 
breadth of conditions our species experi-
ences (Panchanathan et al., 2010).
Finally, Ein-Dor et al. (2010) present two 
kinds of evidence – cognitive and   behavioral 
– to support their hypothesis that insecure 
attachment  styles  evolved  for  benefits  at 
the  group-level.  The  cognitive  evidence 
shows  that  anxiously  attached  individu-
als  detect  potential  threats  relatively  fast 
and alert others about imminent danger. 
It also indicates that avoidant individuals 
initiate self-preservation efforts relatively 
fast, without relying on the help of other 
people.  Both  these  empirical  results  are 
interesting; however, they do not substan-
tiate that these cognitive aspects are adap-
tations “for” the benefit of social groups. 
This is because in each example, individuals 
may themselves derive a net benefit from 
their strategy: anxious individuals because 
early detection of danger facilitates escape, 
while alerting others can induce collective 
efforts to ameliorate the threat: avoidant 
individuals  because  a  focus  on  autono-
mous self-preservation may be adaptive, in 
a world where other people provide little 
social support (Belsky et al., 1991). Thus, 
the cognitive evidence cannot distinguish 
between individual-level and group-level 
benefits. The behavioral evidence provided 
by Ein-Dor et al. (2010) employs a smoke-
in-the-room  experimental  setting,  and 
shows that: “more heterogeneous groups 
in terms of attachment orientations were 
… more effective in dealing with the dan-
gerous situation and took less time to detect 
and deal with the danger” (p. 135). However, 
it is not clear why a group-selection per-
spective would predict that heterogeneous 
groups perform better than homogeneous 
address some features of insecure attach-
ment  styles,  such  as  social  withdrawal 
and high levels of stress. However, they 
do not address other features that may be 
fitness-relevant, such as: low self-esteem, 
greater risk of depression, mixed feelings 
about relationships, indiscriminate self-
disclosure,  ineffective  coping  strategies, 
and over-dependence on others. While it 
may be possible to advance group-level 
benefits for these features as well,   Ein-Dor 
et al. do not discuss them in depth. In biol-
ogy, adaptationist accounts are considered 
most convincing when a close correspond-
ence is revealed between the structure of 
an adaptive problem and the features of 
its solution: it is not sufficient to select 
some features, and hypothesize about their 
adaptive value, while leaving out other, 
equally significant ones.
Concerning ancestral social organiza-
tion, Ein-Dor et al. (2010) assert that all 
members of a group, “in the environment 
of evolutionary adaptedness, would often 
have  been  genetically  related”  (p.  124). 
This premise, if correct, helps their pro-
posal that insecure attachment styles are 
group-level adaptations, because the costs 
incurred by altruistic individuals may be 
compensated by gains in inclusive fitness 
(Hamilton,  1964):  genetic  relatives  are 
more likely to share copies of the same 
alleles,  and  so  helping  kin  implies  fur-
thering one’s own reproductive success. 
However, Ein-Dor et al. (2010) do not pro-
vide sources to support their claim that, 
historically, humans lived in groups com-
posed primarily of kin. To my knowledge, 
no such sources exist. Unfortunately, the 
precise characteristics of ancestral social 
organizations  remain  largely  unknown. 
If  anything,  current  evidence  seems  to 
suggest that humans lived in diverse pat-
terns of social organization, rather than 
a single one (Schrire, 1980; Foley, 1995; 
Irons,  1998;  Marlowe,  2005;  Richerson 
et al., 2009). 
Still,  even  if  we  grant  that  humans 
would have lived in kin-based households, 
such  households  may  have  co-existed 
in  larger  groups  consisting  of  geneti-
cally  non-related  individuals.  To  what 
extent  the  argument  of  Ein-Dor  et  al. 
(2010) formally depends on “kin-groups 
assumption” is hard to know. Analyzing 
it  requires  more  detailed  specification Frankenhuis  Evolution of insecure attachment styles
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